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The 2009 Copenhagen Accord includes a collec-tive pledge by industrialised countries to pro-vide ‘new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international 
institutions, approaching $30 billion for the period 
2010-2012. The allocation of these new resources is 
to be balanced between adaptation and mitigation’ 
(UNFCCC, 2009). These resources are commonly called 
‘fast-start finance’ (FSF). As fast-start finance is seen as a 
testing ground for longer-term arrangements for climate 
finance, it is important to explore how this funding has 
been used to date and what lessons should be drawn 
for the future. 
This Background Note looks at how FSF promises 
have been implemented in practice. It draws on a 
literature and policy document review that analyses 
the following questions: is the collective $30 bn 
pledge really being met? What is the balance between 
support for mitigation and adaptation? What is the 
share of investment flows (loans, equity) and funding 
through international institutions? 
We begin by providing an overview of the knowl-
edge on FSF as of June 2011, roughly halfway through 
the 2010-2012 period. We analyse funding volumes, 
the mitigation-adaptation balance, the grant-loan 
share and the proportion of multilateral and bilateral 
channels. We then go on to focus on governance, 
transparency, and sources of finance.
This Background Note is based on a longer chapter 
entitled ‘Fast start finance: scattered governance, informa-
tion and programmes’ to be published in the forthcoming 
Routledge book Carbon markets or climate finance: Low 
carbon and adaptation investment choices for the develop-
ing world (Michaelowa, forthcoming).
The emergence of fast-start finance
What is the purpose of fast-start finance (FSF)? The $30 bn 
can be seen to serve three implicit goals: meeting the 
financing needs of developing countries to address cli-
mate change; sharing the global burden of addressing 
climate change, and reaching an international climate 
policy agreement for the post-2012 period.
The first goal of FSF is a contribution to the costs of 
financing mitigation and adaptation in the developing 
world. On the one hand, mitigation of climate change 
may entail incremental costs to developing countries 
of $140-175 bn annually by 2030, with the amount of 
necessary investment estimated to be $250-550 bn 
per year (World Bank, 2009). This is under a scenario 
whereby greenhouse gas concentration is stabilised 
at 450ppm CO
2
-eq and assumes this will hold the 
increase in global warming to 2˚C (ibid.). 
On the other hand, adaptation to climate change 
may cost developing countries as much as $75-100 bn 
a year (on average, 2010-2050) according to the 
World Bank (2010). The costs estimated by the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 
2008) of $28-67 bn by 2030 may, therefore, be under-
estimated (Parry et al., 2009). The slow process of 
international climate negotiations and current low 
ambition of national mitigation policies make it very 
unlikely that the 2˚C target will be met, and this is 
likely to increase adaptation costs.
The second goal of FSF is burden sharing. In article 
3.1 of the UNFCCC (1992), the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capa-
bilities has been defined. Developing countries have a 
lower historical responsibility for climate change than 
industrialised countries (often measured by historical 
CO
2
 emissions or current per capita emissions) and are 
also less capable of adapting and paying for mitiga-
tion and adaptation ( Dellink et al., 2009; Müller et al., 
2009). Furthermore, developing countries are likely to 
face larger climate change related losses relative to their 
income than industrialised countries and their capacity 
to cope with climate change is on average lower (Parry 
et al., 2007). Therefore, the climate financing needs of 
developing countries need to be met, at least partly, by 
payments from industrialised countries.
The third goal of FSF is a contribution to reach an 
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ambitious international climate agreement. As part of a 
post-2012 deal, industrialised countries want develop-
ing countries to undertake their own mitigation policies 
and measures. Many developing countries, however, 
are only willing to commit to such actions if they receive 
financial and technological support for both mitigation 
and adaptation measures. While the Copenhagen cli-
mate summit in December 2009 did not result in the 
ambitious legally binding emissions reduction agree-
ment many had hoped for, it resulted in the promise of 
longer-term finance (up to $100 bn by 2020) and of FSF. 
The volume of $30 bn of FSF over three years is an order 
of magnitude below developing countries’ funding 
needs but it is nevertheless ambitious as it implies a 
doubling of international climate-specific public finan-
cial flows. FSF is therefore seen as a testing ground for 
future climate finance, especially for the longer-term 
$100 bn of ‘public and private’ funding to be provided 
annually by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2009).
What we currently know about FSF
FSF has no specific structure or form, and it has no direct 
legal implications. It is simply a tool to demonstrate a 
scaling up of support towards immediate climate change 
activities in developing countries. FSF does not create 
new funds or initiatives, but rather uses existing channels 
of delivery and disbursement. Therefore, trying to track 
FSF and separate out what is counted as FSF alongside 
existing flows is rather difficult, given that most fund-
ing channels overlap. For example Australia, Belgium, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the US con-
sider funding to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
as part of their FSF pledges, others (Canada, Finland, 
France, the UK) only partly count it, while Denmark and 
Germany, for example, do not count it at all.
Hence, separating out FSF as a financial flow is 
rather difficult and has only limited application. 
Analysing the amount of ‘new and additional’ FSF 
gives some indications as to whether climate funds 
have been stepped-up since Copenhagen, but FSF is – 
apart from its requirement to be ‘new and additional’ 
– no different to other public climate finance flows.
As is the case for other public funding between 
industrialised and developing countries, FSF can be 
split along the following phases:
1. Pledges: finance pledged by an industrialised 
country to a developing country made through a 
political statement (either oral or written).
2. Commitments: funding that has been firmly obli-
gated within the contributor country for FSF, for 
example earmarked within a national budget. (This 
differs from the OECD definition, which sees commit-
ments as firm obligations in writing and backed by 
the necessary funds undertaken by an official donor 
to assist a country or a multilateral organisation.)
3. Allocations: funding that has been earmarked to 
a specific climate initiative or fund, or for specific 
projects/programmes in recipient countries.
4. Disbursements: funds that have been spent, either 
through administrative means, payment to a fund, 
or directly to an implementation programme or 
project, with proof of spending.
Data sources 
Currently, www.faststartfinance.org is the only 
government-initiated and supported reporting initia-
tive collecting data on FSF. This website, initiated by 
the Netherlands and supported by other contributor 
governments as well as international organisations, 
came online in mid-2010 and provides information 
on the funding provided by individual industrialised 
countries. Since reporting is ad hoc and voluntary, 
individual country funding reports vary in granularity 
and detail and are neither complete or comprehen-
sive, nor comparable in nature.
Some NGOs analysed fast-start funds before this gov-
ernmental website was set up, with the World Resources 
Institute (WRI, 2011) website being the one that is most 
encompassing and most regularly updated. As the WRI 
takes a critical view on the information provided on 
www.faststartfinance.org, and also includes some addi-
tional data, we make some use of this information.
Most Annex-1 countries reported on their FSF 
programmes in May/June 2011, as, in the Cancun 
Agreement, all Annex I countries to the UNFCCC are 
invited to report annually on their fast-start activities by 
May 2011, 2012 and 2013 (UNFCCC, 2010). These reports 
provide even less comparable data than the above men-
tioned sources but we are including some of its updated 
information. One step to comparability may be the infor-
mation document on the fast-start reports the UNFCCC 
wants to publish in summer 2011 (IISD, 2011).
The data we present below are based on the follow-
ing sources:
• Pledged amounts come from the faststartfinance.
org (2011) website, which provides the same data for 
pledged funds as WRI. If allocations as reported in the 
2011 fast-start reports (UNFCCC, 2011) were higher, 
then these pledges were updated. 
• Committed amounts are taken from two sources. 
First, we take commitments from faststartfinance.
org showing the figures reported by the countries 
themselves. These data have a quasi-official sta-
tus, but unfortunately there is no agreed defini-
tion of ‘commitments’ across reporting countries 
and the figures may not be comparable. Therefore, 
we also show the committed-requested amounts 
from WRI (2011), which defines this category as 
‘actions taken by either the executive and/or legis-
lative bodies of the country to make the resources 
pledged available to developing countries’. The 
WRI figures include some funding not reported as 
‘committed’ on faststartfinance.org – either funds 
that are requested but not committed or funds 
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where parties have forgotten to inscribe the com-
mitments on the website – but it excludes funds 
where the reported ‘commitment’ is doubtful, as 
it has not yet resulted in any legislative action.
• Allocated amounts are taken from the data pre-
sented on individual projects, programmes and 
funds included in the contributing country reports on 
faststartfinance.org and accompanying links to web-
sites providing country-specific information, while 
some figures are updated with data from the 2011 
fast-start reports submitted to the UNFCCC (2011).
The main challenge is to assure comparability, which 
is aggravated by at least two issues: exchange rate 
and additionality. First, because exchange rates vary 
continuously, certain comparisons are only valid for 
one moment in time. We used exchange rates in June 
2011 from Oanda (2011). Second, countries use differ-
ent baselines to justify their funding as ‘new and addi-
tional’ (Brown et al., 2010; Stadelmann et al., 2010). 
Therefore, some countries may provide totally fresh 
resources while others just re-label already promised 
pledges. We do not control for the ‘additionality’ of FSF 
because of the methodological challenges involved but 
we discuss overall additionality of FSF below.
Table 1 (overleaf) demonstrates the amounts 
reported as pledged, committed and allocated 
to FSF. While 94% of the promised $30 bn has 
been pledged, only 21-45% has been ‘committed-
requested’, and an even lower 29% has been allo-
cated to specific projects. The volume of allocated 
funds can be higher than the committed funds, as 
some countries may plan spending funds for specific 
programmes and funds without it being approved by 
the legislative bodies in charge. The pledges range 
from around $1 million (Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Malta) to Japan’s $15 bn. Relative to GNI, we see 
some countries pledging close to 0.1% of their 2009 
GNI for FSF (Japan, Norway and Sweden), while the 
average is 0.02% (based on the annual average FSF 
pledge). All in all, the comparability between country 
data is so low that we can only conclude that the 
promise of $30 bn is almost met by pledges but that 
far less has been yet committed and allocated.
Thematic focus of fast-start finance
For the FSF pledges and allocations that specify their 
thematic focus, there appears to be a greater focus on 
mitigation (including reducing emissions from defor-
estation and forest degradation: REDD) than on adap-
tation. In all, 67% has been pledged or allocated to 
mitigation (which includes 17% to REDD), and only 21% 
to adaptation, with 11% going to a multiple or unknown 
focus (see Figure 1). Certainly these overall figures 
hide some important differences between individual 
donors: Australia and the EU Commission are provid-
ing an equal share of their resources to both mitigation 
and adaptation, while Japan has allocated a mere 10% 
towards adaptation. 
Many civil society organisations and developing 
countries in need of immediate support for adaptation 
argue that the ‘balanced’ allocation between mitigation 
and adaptation to which developed countries commit-
ted themselves in the Copenhagen Accord requires an 
equal split in resources being allocated to adaptation 
and mitigation. Others argue that a ‘balanced’ alloca-
tion can be interpreted in a variety of ways, and that an 
increased investment in mitigation today means lower 
emissions and hence less need for adaptation tomor-
row, justifying prioritisation of mitigation finance in the 
immediate term.
Bilateral versus multilateral FSF channels 
In terms of delivery channels, some countries do not 
report on whether FSF funding will be delivered through 
bilateral or multilateral channels. For those that do, it 
appears there is a fairly close split between the two – 
roughly 41% has been allocated to multilateral delivery 
channels, 51% bilateral and 8% unknown (see Figure 
2 overleaf). This means that FSF is channelled more 
through multilateral channels, relatively, than through 
past development and climate funds. In 2008 and 
2009, multilateral channels represented only 30-45% of 
both general and climate-marked Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and other financial flows (OOF), 
with OOF representing flows that are not concessional 
enough to be counted as ODA (OECD, 2011b). Still, even 
more may have been expected to be channelled through 
multilateral funds given their recent proliferation. 
The split in FSF spending between bilateral and mul-
tilateral indicates that many donors are interested in 
preserving their bilateral control over climate finance. 
The push to work bilaterally may come out of a sense that 
Figure 1: Share of mitigation and adaptation 
in FSF
Source: The authors from faststartfinance.org, WRI (2011).
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recent funds (such as the Climate Investment Funds of the 
World Bank) have been slow to take shape and to spend, 
and that they lack the tools (and in some countries the 
institutional credibility) to bring about lasting governance 
reform (personal communication with DFID associate).
Grants vs. loans 
The Copenhagen Accord states that FSF includes 
‘investments through international institutions’. While 
investments are not clearly defined, they are under-
stood to include loans. Indeed, of the FSF for which the 
grant/loan share is known, roughly one third is paid as 
loans or as capital contribution (Figure 3). Capital con-
tributions differ from one-time loans as funds receiving 
capital contribution can reinvest the money once loans 
are repaid (DECC and DFID, 2010). 
Is this inclusion of loans beneficial? There are two 
sides of the coin. On the one hand, many developing 
countries and some NGOs feel that the inclusion of 
Table 1: Pledged, committed and allocated fast-start finance 
Country Amount pledged 
($ m.)
Average annual FSF 
Pledge/GNI (2009)
Amount committed-
requested ($ m.)
Amount committed 
($ m.)
Amount allocated to 
funds/projects ($ m.)
Data source faststartfinane.org, 
UNFCCC (2011)
GNI: World Bank (2011) WRI (2011) faststartfinance.org faststartfinance.org, 
UNFCCC (2011)
EU Commission 214.7 71.6 71.6 71.6
Australia 641.1 0.02% 641.1 0.0 641.1
Austria 58.0 0.00% - - 58.0
Belgium 214.7 0.01% 60.1 60.1 60.1
Canada 409.5 0.01% 409.5 0.0 409.5
Cyprus 0.9 0.00% - 0.0 0.9
Czech Republic 2.4 0.00% - 0.0 2.4
Denmark 229.9 0.02% 59.0 59.0 7.9
Finland 157.4 0.02% 143.1 0.0 32.9
France 1,803.5 0.02% 601.2 1,803.5 609.6
Germany 1,803.5 0.02% 509.6 417.8 442.7
Greece 6.3 0.00% - - 6.3
Hungary 1.4 0.00% - - 1.4
Iceland 1.0 0.00% 1.0 0.0 1.0
Ireland 143.1 0.02% - - 34.7
Italy 386.2 0.01% - - 426.1
Japan 15,000.0 0.10% 7,200.0 0.0 1,958.7
Liechtenstein 1.2 0.00% - 1.2 1.2
Luxemburg 12.9 0.01% 4.3 12.9 4.3
Malta 1.1 0.01% 0.2 0.2 0.2
Netherlands 443.7 0.02% - 443.7 432.6
New Zealand 72.8 0.02% 308.8 308.8 382.8
Norway 1,000.0 0.08% 382.0 382.0 473.5
Poland 4.6 0.00% - 0.0 4.6
Portugal 51.5 0.01% 17.2 17.2 30.4
Slovakia 1.5 0.00% - 0.0 1.5
Slovenia 11.5 0.01% 11.5 0.0 0.1
Spain 536.8 0.01% 191.8 0.0 184.8
Sweden 1,145.1 0.08% 164.6 - 159.4
Switzerland 164.7 0.01% - 0.0 17.7
UK 2,475.6 0.03% 937.4 937.4 1,044.1
US 1,704.0 0.004% 1,704.0 1,700.0 1,083.7
Total 28,700.5 0.02% 13,418.0 6,215.4 8,585.5
% of pledge 100% 47% 22% 30%
% of $30 billion 96% 45% 21% 29%
Source: The authors, from data sources listed.
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loans may lead to higher Southern debts, and that it is 
inconsistent with the notion of funds for adaptation as 
some kind of ‘compensation’ for damages. Even a high 
share of one-time loans would leave the actual net-
disbursed level below $30 bn, as funds have to be re-
paid later on. On the other hand, loans may have some 
benefits. In the case of capital contributions, loans are 
reinvested when they are paid back, which increases 
the grant-equivalence over time. Furthermore, some 
studies have found that (in the case of re-investments) 
loans are more beneficial than grants for more devel-
oped, less-indebted countries with good fiscal policies, 
and for low-risk revenue generating projects (Cordella 
and Ulku, 2004; Baudienville et al., 2009).
The status of disbursed funds
Importantly, there are virtually no data on the extent to 
which funds have been disbursed or delivered to specific 
projects, programmes and countries. This is a problem, 
as understanding how FSF is being implemented requires 
understanding how the finance committed by donor 
countries is actually being delivered on the ground.
Some countries use words in their fast-start reports 
that suggest disbursements. The newest EU report on 
FSF (EU, 2011) provides 2010 finance numbers under 
the heading ‘delivering on our commitments’, but again 
there is no agreed definition of what ‘delivered’ actually 
means. It most likely refers to activities that have been 
approved or where money has been allocated, but not 
actually spent. Similarly, Australia (2011) says that one 
third of its fast-start package has been ‘provided’ to 
countries, regions and multilateral initiatives, which 
seems to be one step further than commitments. But 
again, the term ‘provided’ is not clearly defined.
In fairness, the actual delivery and disbursement 
of finance is often hard to measure given the nature 
and complexity of how finance is channelled (Figure 
4). Flows of International public finance from industr-
ialised to developing countries tend to pass through 
several intermediary channels before reaching the 
end user, making the actual flow and delivery of 
finance hard to follow. Because of the intermediary 
steps through which the finance passes, a donor may 
consider the money disbursed without the project 
receiving any money at all. From the donor’s perspec-
tive, funds have been ‘disbursed’ from their accounts 
to another (implementing agency’s) account. 
As a result, in part, of this complexity, FSF and 
climate finance in general tend to be rather slow in 
disbursement, getting caught up in intermediary insti-
tutions and channels. Multilateral funds often give a 
particular role to international implementing organisa-
tions with complex sign-off procedures, such as the 
GEF and its implementing agencies, the World Bank, 
UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and others. International climate 
funds also tend to have lengthy project approval proce-
dures, which can cause severe delays in project deliv-
Figure 2: Share of bi- and multilateral 
channels in FSF 
Source: The authors from faststartfinance.org, WRI (2011).
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Source: The authors from faststartfinance.org, WRI (2011).
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Source: The authors.
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ery. In addition, projects can be easily conceptualised 
and budgets created, but actual implementation of 
complex activities takes time and delays are common, 
particularly as addressing adaptation is a new area 
where there is a lack of experience and proficiency. 
There are a few important takeaway points from 
our current knowledge of FSF: 
• FSF represents financial commitments made in a 
political context, and does not represent the crea-
tion of any new fund or institution. Rather, FSF will be 
delivered through existing channels within the estab-
lished international climate finance architecture.
• Pledges almost reach the promised level of $30 bn, 
but actual commitments and allocations are much 
lower as of June 2011 and there is hardly any infor-
mation on disbursements. It appears that funds are 
slow to get out of the door and, although funding 
may be committed within the period of 2010-2012, 
it is unlikely that funds committed will be spent in 
this timeframe. 
• Although countries committed to a ‘balanced’ allo-
cation of climate finance between adaptation and 
mitigation, FSF appears to heavily prioritise mitiga-
tion investments.
• Bilateral and multilateral support seems to be fairly 
split, but in many cases contributor countries have 
not reported on their intended FSF delivery channels.
Governance and transparency of FSF
Fast-start finance has had a complex and decentralised 
governance structure from the beginning. The UNFCCC 
provides an arena for the loose, non-institutionalised 
exchange of information (e.g. in side events at UNFCCC 
conferences), while contributors themselves decide on 
the amount, timing, channels and spending of their 
funding. Furthermore, recipients do not have any firm 
obligations. The decentralised and ad hoc structure 
certainly complicates coordination but it may also have 
its benefits in terms of flexibility of timing, channels 
and programmes, which allows for testing. 
The transparency of FSF has become a hotly 
debated topic, given that decentralised governance 
also means lack of official and verified information. 
Transparency is important to build trust that funding 
is being provided and is being spent wisely (Roberts 
et al., 2010; Schalatek et al., 2010; Tirpak, 2010; 
Transparency International, 2011b). While NGOs and 
scholars often call for transparency on the provision 
and channelling of fast-start finance, transparency 
may be of equal importance on the spending side to 
assure effective use of funding and avoid corruption.
Apart from the currently available sources (faststart-
finance.org, WRI, www.climatefundsupdate.org, and 
fast-start reports by June 2011), two additional sources 
will be available after the fast-start period of 2010-2012. 
First, information submitted to UNFCCC, consisting of 
both the non-reviewed voluntary fast-start reports (May 
2012, 2013) and the obligatory and reviewed National 
Communications of Annex-1 parties, which must report 
on the financial resources provided. Second, the OECD 
DAC data on aid flows will provide information on the 
level of development and climate flows, around two 
years after the disbursement. 
At that point, the 2010-2012 disbursements can be 
compared with the pre-Copenhagen years of 2007-2009 
to assess if climate funds have increased by $10 bn 
per year without diverting non-climate ODA. This is 
assuming that, as a result of recent debates and more 
public scrutiny, the low quality of coding by donors 
and its vulnerability to political interests is addressed 
(see Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2010). 
It is unlikely that full UN documents and OECD data 
will be available before 2014, therefore policy-makers 
and researchers will have to rely on scattered, diverse 
and non-reviewed sources of information for the next 
two years.
Table 2 shows the parameters for current informa-
tion and that likely to be available by 2014. 
Table 2: Transparency in FSF in the short and long term 
 
Parameter Current information Possible information by 2014
Sources Transparency level Sources Transparency level
Sources of funding FSF reports, FSF website +(+) NC, FSF reports, FSF website ++?
Level, pledged FSF reports, FSF website, WRI ++ NC, FSF reports, FSF website +
Level, disbursed (FSF reports) (+) OECD, NC +(+)?
Baseline for ‘new and additional’ FSF reports, website, WRI (+) NC, FSF reports, FSF website (+)?
Grants, loans or capital contribution FSF reports, FSF website + NC, FSF reports, FSF website +(+)?
Channel: bilateral vs. multilateral FSF reports, FSF website + NC, FSF reports, OECD, FSF website +(+)?
Use: adaptation vs. mitigation FSF reports, FSF website + NC, FSF reports, OECD, FSF website +(+)?
Use: recipient FSF reports, FSF website + NC, FSF reports, OECD, FSF website +(+)?
Use: programme features FSF reports, FSF website (+) NC, FSF reports, FSF website +?
Use: Effectiveness - 0 ? 0?
Notes: ++ fully transparent, comparable, + partly transparent, comparable, 0 not transparent, comparable. FSF reports: voluntary FSF reports; FSF 
website: faststartfinance.org; WRI: World Resources Institute, NC: National communications; OECD: OECD DAC statistics. Source: The authors.
7Background Note
Sources of ‘new and additional’ FSF
Even if $30 bn is delivered, this does not guarantee 
the automatic fulfilment of the Copenhagen prom-
ises. The remaining question is whether the $30 bn is 
really ‘new and additional’.
Most contributor countries claim that their fund-
ing is ‘new and additional’ but this is not, in fact, 
apparent. The major problem is that while ‘new and 
additional’ has been a criterion for all UN climate 
finance since Rio, its baseline has never been prop-
erly defined. Definitions for ‘new and additional’ 
range from those that refer to funds beyond the 
‘0.7% goal of GNI spent for ODA’ to any increase in 
climate finance above previous spending (Brown et 
al., 2010; Stadelmann et al., 2010). Given the lack of 
one single definition, it is impossible to be conclusive 
on whether funds are new or additional. Comparing 
funding and pledges made before Copenhagen with 
data on FSF (on faststartfinance.org; WRI, 2011) we 
estimate that around half of fast-start funds were 
promised or planned before Copenhagen. 
Linked to the issue of ‘new and additional’ is the 
sourcing of FSF: the current dependence on govern-
ment budgets will make it difficult to scale-up and 
secure ‘new and additional’ climate funds. FSF has 
been most commonly sourced from the general 
national budgets of industrialised countries, but 
general budgets are always subject to domestic 
pressure and suffer from decreased income in times 
of economic downturns, as experienced in 2008 and 
2009. Therefore, climate funds from general budgets 
are subject to budget cuts and unpredictability. 
US climate finance, for example, has fallen 
from 2010 to 2011 because of fiscal constraints 
(Volvovici, 2011) and the FSF proposed by the 
Swiss Government was almost cut by its parlia-
ment. Another common argument against the use 
of general budgets to support climate finance is the 
risk that support to more mainstream development 
objectives will be diverted. There are concerns that 
instead of using new sources of finance to address 
climate change, governments may simply re-
channel money originally planned for development 
to climate issues, although this claim is slightly 
problematic given the overlapping goals of climate 
mitigation, adaptation and development.
Providing reliable, predictable funds beyond FSF 
will require new sources, preferably instruments 
that put a price on carbon emissions, such as inter-
national transport levies or the auctioning of emis-
sion allowances (UN, 2010). One existing innovative 
source used for climate finance is the application of 
a 2% levy on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
credits, used as the main funding source of the 
Adaptation Fund. However, this innovative source 
has not reached the desired scale, in part because 
of the current weakness of the carbon markets. 
Conclusions
It is not yet possible to assess if the $30 bn FSF promised 
in Copenhagen will be delivered completely and effec-
tively. While the collective pledges by developed countries 
almost meet this figure, less than half of the money has 
been committed or allocated to projects, and even less 
had been disbursed by June 2011. 
Given the long procedures of different chan-
nels, part of this finance will be delivered – if it is 
delivered at all – after 2012, which marks the close 
of the FSF period. Even when countries report that 
the money has been delivered, it is not certain that 
those resources will be new and additional to ODA 
and existing pledges. While the fact that most FSF will 
be counted as ODA may not be problematic in itself, 
the fact that around half of the funding was planned 
before Copenhagen and the difficulties of proving 
whether or not climate finance commitments divert 
the focus from other development spending goals 
raise some issues. 
New sources of climate finance will be needed to 
avoid this diversion of funding and assure independ-
ence from general budgets, which are subject to short-
term political pressure and economic cycles. Within 
FSF, only Germany has earmarked some funds from 
new sources. Much more funding will be need to be 
secured from such sources (e.g. carbon taxes, auction-
ing of emission allowances) to ensure a scale-up of 
FSF. 
The governance of FSF has been decentralised, with 
various multilateral and bilateral channels. While this 
decentralised system helps to increase flexibility it 
raises questions on accountability and transparency. 
For example, there are no common reporting standards. 
Some information on sources and channels is available 
but little is coordinated or comparable. There is almost 
no centralised information about the impacts of the 
funding or the way in which funding is delivered.
Learning from fast-start funding, the transparency of 
providing climate finance can certainly be improved. 
Enhanced transparency could be achieved in two ways. 
First, a central system for tracking climate finance 
could be established, either by improving the current 
OECD system or creating a new UN system through, 
for example, the extension of the planned registry of 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) to 
include adaptation. In addition to official data from 
both contributors and recipients, third party sources 
from non-governmental actors should be included 
(see e.g. AidData and www.climatefundsupdate.org). 
Second, transparency could be improved by 
strengthening the existing reporting requirements 
under the UNFCCC and associated definitions of cli-
mate finance (Buchner et al., 2011). The decisions 
adopted by the international community in Cancun 
(improved reporting, voluntary fast-start reports, 
establishing a NAMA registry) are first steps to more 
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transparency and give the UNFCCC the mandate to act 
on this issue (UNFCCC, 2010). 
In addition to the need to enhance transparency 
and the need for monitoring, reporting and verifi-
cation systems, our analysis of FSF concludes that 
longer-term climate finance should also aim for 
greater coordination of donor organisations, the 
measurement of results and improvements in proce-
dures for learning. 
Written by Jessica Brown, ODI (j.brown@odi.org.uk), Martin 
Stadelmann, Center of Comparative and International Studies, 
University of Zurich (martin.stadelmann@pw.uzh.ch), and Lena 
Hörnlein, Perspectives GmbH (lenahoemlein@gmail.com).
Please note: the full version of this paper is forthcoming in: Axel 
Michaelowa (ed.) Carbon markets or climate finance: Low carbon 
and adaptation investment choices for the developing world. 
London, Routledge, 2012.
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